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OLD QUESTIONS, NEW CONTEXTS:

CORPORATE LAW IN EMERGING NATIONS

Kellye Y. Testy*
While the exponential expansion of the global marketplace in the last
few years has brought forth a wealth of new challenges and opportunities
for participants,' it has also unearthed some old questions worth revisiting.
One of those questions concerns the enduring policy debate in corporate
law over the fundamental nature and role of the publicly held corporation
and the type of law that should govern it. In the United States, this debate
has surfaced at several intervals since the early 1930s, when Adolf A.
Berle, Jr. and E. Merrick Dodd began vigorously debating the role of the
corporation in society.2 In the 1960s and 1970s this debate resurfaced as
one over the externalities generated by corporate activities-including
environmental and workplace hazards, illegal political contributions, and
foreign-directed bribes and kickbacks-that the market arguably did not
adequately deter. The takeover controversies in the 1980s spurred yet
another version of essentially the same debate,4 and now, in the 1990s, the

* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. Thanks to the New
York Law School for the opportunity to participate as a scholarship recipient in the Sixth
Annual Stiefel Symposium: Bankruptcy and Corporate Development in Emerging Nations.
1. See, e.g., Robert Chote, Economic Integration Holds Key to Growth: More
Developing Countrieson Course to Catch up with IndustrialisedCounterparts,FIN. TIMES,
May 8, 1996, at 6; Swati R. Ghosh, Reverse Linkages: The Growing Importance of
Developing Countries. Global Economic Prospectsand the Developing Countries, FIN. &
DEV., Mar. 1996, at 38.
2. The Berle-Dodd debate spanned over twenty years. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.,
THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). See generally THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (E. Mason ed., 1959).
3. See generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).

4. See generally ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOuN'TABILIT"Y
(1991).
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proliferation of corporate development in emerging nations has created a
prime opportunity to renew this debate once again. Along with all of the
new and exciting issues to examine within this new context,5 the
opportunity to revisit the old questions about the extent of corporations'
social responsibilities should not be neglected. Indeed, the context in
which these corporations are situated, 6 as well as the fact that the form and
content of corporate laws in emerging countries are largety influenced by
students of United States corporate law, 7 make it all the more urgent and
necessary to revisit these key issues of corporate responsibility and social
justice.8
As noted, the debate over the appropriate role of the corporation in
society is an old one, often resulting in rather polarized views. Simply put,
under one view, the corporation is a private entity, whose duty is to
maximize shareholder profits. 9 Under the contrary view, the corporation

5. Many of those were reviewed during NYLS's symposium where participants were
able to discuss many issues regarding bankruptcy and corporate development in emerging
nations in the context of a hypothetical problem set in a particular nation.
6. Each nation, of course, has its own unique context in which corporate development
takes place. Some of the emerging nations have social situations that are arguably more
pressing from a social justice standpoint than are others. This is not to suggest, however,
that the United States is not also a nation where increased corporate responsibility could
have salutary effects as well. Moreover, in an increasingly global economy, ethical
systems and values are bound to collide. Ethical norms and the level of adherence to them
can vary substantially from person to person across cultural boundaries, making the project
of "global" corporate social responsibility even more complex. For a discussion of this
ethical complexity, see Jacob Manakkalathil and Eric Rudolf, Corporate Social
Responsibility in a Globalizing Market, 60 SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J. 29 (1995), available
in WESTLAW 1995 WL 12533259. See also Steven R. Salbu, True Codes Versus
Voluntary Codes of Ethics in InternationalMarkets: Towards the Preservationof Colloquy
in Emerging Global Communities, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 327 (1994).
7. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate

Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996) (detailing the process of corporate law development
in Russia).
8. Not only is it necessary in terms of elucidating the form of capitalism that should
operate within the emerging nations, but also to stimulate discussions at home as well. At
present, fewer than five percent of America's retailers have tackled any human rights
issues, such as child labor, with regard to the companies with whom they do business. See
Ethical Shopping: Human Rights, ECONOMIST, June 3, 1995, at 58.
9. This type of view was held by Berle, see supra note 2. For another forceful
statement of this view, see MLTONq FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-34 (1962).
The modem "contractarian" view of the corporation is derivative of this viewpoint. See,
e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE

LAW (1993); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, ContractualFreedom in Corporate
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is an economic institution with responsibility for a wider constituency,
including society as a whole.' ° These two views stem from differing
conceptions of the nature of the corporation itself. Under the profit

maximization view, the corporation is a nexus of private contracts merely
enabled by the state. Thus, from an economic standpoint, the argument is
made that legal rules should be directed primarily at sustaining market
forces and enforcing contractual arrangements; legal intervention to
advance other goals is inefficient and unnecessary." Under the social
responsibility view, the corporation is seen as an entity created by the state,
whose liability is limited by the state, and is thus subject to regulation by
the state for the public's welfare. Under this view, legal rules that seek to

protect a particular corporate constituency or society in general are
encouraged, especially where that constituency's ability to protect itself is
compromised.' 2 Although there is a vocal minority in the United States
favoring the social responsibility camp,' 3 corporate law in the United States
is largely of the enabling variety-the Berle camp has carried the day. 4
While these questions are still debated within United States corporate
law, the questions demand reexamination given the proliferation of
emerging market economies and corporate formation and activity within

Law: Articles & Comments; The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
10. Adherents to some form of this view span an enormous range, from persons who
advocate minimal limits on contractual freedom to persons who advocate a proactive
corporate duty to improve societal welfare. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter
Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); Douglas Branson, Recent Changes to the
Model Business CorporationAct: Death Knells forMain Street CorporationLaw, 72 NEB.
L. REV. 258 (1993); William W. Bratton Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A
CriticalAppraisal,74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989); Douglass Cassel, CorporateInitiatives:
A Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963 (1996); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989).
11. See sources cited supra notes 2 & 9.
12. See sources cited supra notes 2 & 10.
13. I daresay a growing one. Many recent initiatives have been pressed to further
corporate social responsibility. See, e.g., Cassel, supra note 10 (detailing many recent
initiatives).
14. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Objective and Conduct of the Corporationand
CorporateStructure, 1994 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, A.L.I.'s PRINCIPLES OF CORP.
GOVERNANCE 1 (stating that the corporation's primary objective should be to enhance
corporate profit and shareholder gain within the bounds of the law). A reasonable amount
of resources, however, may be devoted to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and
philanthropic purposes. Id.
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those regions. Given that many of the architects of those countries'
corporate laws either are or were influenced by corporate law experts from
the United States, it is particularly appropriate that we reexamine these
questions on two fronts: first, we should take this opportunity to reflect on
our own attitudes toward this issue, with the hope of not only improving
our lot, but also with the hope of not urging our mistakes on others,
pa ticularly in cases wheye public confidence in new capitalism may need
to be fostered to protect citizens' basic welfare;' 5 second, even if we are
to conclude that the United States' presently constituted view of corporate
law is a sound one, we should carefully consider the additional societal
institutions that make our system a fair and efficient one and examine
whether they are lacking in developing nations.
A reexamination of the fundamental nature of the corporation, its role
in society, and the legal framework that is appropriate for its governance,
is a healthy exercise in itself. This opportunity for renewed reflection can
be used to seriously question the normative goal of profit maximizing
corporate service to society. More particularly, rigorous examination of
what qualifies as "profit" is called for. Even assuming that we mean
"long-term" as opposed to "short-term" profit, what kinds of things count?
Does less pollution qualify? Less racism? Does a corporation maximize
profit when workplace policies support family leave? What about paying
workers so that they can enjoy a more generous standard of living than
minimum wage allows-is that "profit"? And are corporations that refuse
to deal with companies who violate human rights, even though they forgo
a cheap source of labor or materials, "profiting"? As the distinction
between the public and the private continues to collapse, these questions
are ones worth considering. Indeed, perhaps if the meaning of profit were
to be reassessed, the normative goal of profit maximization might be one
around which immense support could coalesce, merging the heretofore
rather polarized views of the appropriate role of the corporation in modern
6
society.1
Even if this kind of searching reexamination of the basic assumptions
that underlies corporate law is not done, or does not change corporate law
in practice, there is still another task demanding attention before our
particular version of corporate law is imported into emerging nations.
Close attention must be paid to the particular economic, political, and
cultural context in which corporate law is to be situated. If the basic task
15. If corporate law fails to prohibit or punish rampant self-dealing, bribery, corruption
and other scandals, the legitimacy of private ownership and support for a market economy
can be eroded, creating significant destabilization in the emerging nation's economy.
16. See discussion supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
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of corporate law is to create a governance structure for corporations that7
promotes an appropriate degree of accountability among the participants,1
then one needs to examine whether corporate law is to be the primary
constraint, or whether other constraints already exist that provide
accountability. One of the reasons that the United States' enabling version
of corporate law functions as well as it does is that it does not work alone.
In the United States, we have, for the most part, well-developed, efficient
markets and a judicial system that is, again for the most part, competent
and fair. Corporate conduct is constrained by both the market and the
knowledge that the courts can and will enforce legal rights. In addition to
the market and the courts, many institutions have a role to play in
corporate accountability-for instance, the ideology of contractual freedom
is strong in this country, and the press is comparatively independent and
vigorous. In addition, we have not only corporate laws to govern corporate
behavior, but also a host of other laws that channel corporate behavior,
including an efficient and sophisticated federal securities regulation
scheme, employment and labor laws, tax laws, environmental laws, and
ERISA. Thus, because our corporate laws work in tandem with a host of
other constraints on corporate behavior, that behavior may be more deeply
channeled into socially desirable ends than initially appears to be the case
from our purely corporate laws.
In emerging nations, on the other hand, many of these institutional
constraints will be missing or less well developed. 8 Moreover, the nature
and strength of those institutions will vary from nation to nation and from
region to region, so making generalizations about the appropriate form and
structure of corporate law becomes difficult if not dangerous. Accordingly,
close attention to the wider context in which corporate law will operate is
needed, because the gaps left by an enabling version of corporate law may
be left unfilled or filled differently among various nations. 19 Under this
view, the legal rules that are selected for corporate governance in emerging
nations are driven less by their internal logic than by the social world in
which they will exist.

17. See LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POLICY 9 (3d ed.
1994).
18. See Black & Kraakman, supra note 7, for a full development of this argument in
the context of Russian corporate law.
19. The emphasis on the particulars of the locality in which the corporate law will
function makes clear the need for coordinated effort among and between persons familiar
with that culture and experts in corporate law. One cannot operate successfully without
the other.
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Many complex and interesting questions are presented by emerging
market economies and an increasingly international marketplace. As those
questions are examined and deliberated, however, the opportunity to revisit
some of the core questions of corporate law should not be ignored. The
role of the corporation in modern society is one such question worth
examining, with the hope that its reexamination will not only be useful for
corporate development in emerging nations, but also will help to more fully
illuminate the proper scope and nature of the corporation's activities in
developed markets as well,

